| PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2<\/td>\n | undefined <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 5<\/td>\n | Annex ZA (normative)Normative references to international publicationswith their corresponding European publications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 6<\/td>\n | CONTENTS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 8<\/td>\n | FOREWORD <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 10<\/td>\n | INTRODUCTION <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 11<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 12<\/td>\n | 3 Terms, definitions, and abbreviated terms 3.1 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 16<\/td>\n | 3.2 Abbreviated terms 4 Safety and security overview 4.1 General 4.2 Safety objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 17<\/td>\n | 4.3 Security objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 18<\/td>\n | Figures Figure 1 \u2013 Relationship between threat(s), vulnerabilities, consequence(s)and security risk(s) for SCS performing safety function(s) Figure 2 \u2013 Possible effects of security risk(s) to an SCS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | 5 Security aspects related to functional safety 5.1 General 5.1.1 Security risk assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 20<\/td>\n | 5.1.2 Security risk response strategy 5.2 Security countermeasures 5.2.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 21<\/td>\n | Table 1 \u2013 Overview of foundational requirements and possible influence(s) on an SCS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 22<\/td>\n | 5.2.2 Identification and authentication 5.2.3 Use control 5.2.4 System integrity 5.2.5 Data confidentiality <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 23<\/td>\n | 5.2.6 Restricted data flow 5.2.7 Timely response to events 5.2.8 Resource availability 6 Cybersecurity and functional safety of machinery 6.1 General 6.2 Aspects related to the protection against corruption <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 24<\/td>\n | 6.3 Security countermeasures against corruption 6.3.1 General 6.3.2 Potential sources of cyber threats 6.3.3 Multi-factor authentication 6.3.4 Network architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 25<\/td>\n | 6.3.5 Portable devices 6.3.6 Wireless communication 6.3.7 Remote access <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | 6.3.8 Attack through direct physical connection 7 Verification and maintenance of security countermeasures 8 Information for the user of the machine(s) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative)Basic information related to threats and threat modelling approach A.1 Evaluation of threats <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 28<\/td>\n | A.2 Examples of threat related to a safety-related device <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 29<\/td>\n | Figure A.1 \u2013 Safety-related device and possible accesses <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 30<\/td>\n | Annex B (informative)Security risk assessment triggers B.1 General B.2 Event driven triggers <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 31<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative)Example of information flow between device supplier, manufacturerof machine, integrator and user of machine C.1 General C.2 Example 1 \u2013 Design phase of the machine C.3 Example 2 \u2013 Use phase of the machine Figure C.1 \u2013 Example of generic information flow during design phase <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 32<\/td>\n | Figure C.2 \u2013 Example of generic information flow during use phase Figure C.3 \u2013 Example of information flow during use phase in context of IEC 62443-2-4 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 33<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Safety of machinery. Security aspects related to functional safety of safety-related control systems<\/b><\/p>\n |