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BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-90-2:2016

BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-90-2:2016

$215.11

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Using IEC 61850 for communication between substations and control centres

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2016 192
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This part of IEC 61850, which is a technical report, provides a comprehensive overview of the different aspects that need to be considered while using IEC 61850 for information exchange between substations and control or maintenance centres or other system level applications. In particular, this technical report:

  • defines use cases and communication requirements that require an information exchange between substations and control or maintenance centres

  • describes the usage of the configuration language of IEC 61850-6

  • gives guidelines for the selection of communication services and architectures compatible with IEC 61850

  • describes the engineering workflow

  • introduces the use of a Proxy/Gateway concept

  • describes the links regarding the Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)

This technical report does not define constraints or limitations for specific device implementations. There is no specific chapter for cyber security which is tackled when it is necessary. The model, for IEC TR 61850-90-2, provides security functions based upon the security threats and security functions found in IEC TS 62351-1 and IEC TS 62351-2. This technical report touches several security aspects with the following basic assumptions:

  • Information authentication and integrity (e.g. the ability to provide tamper detection) is needed

  • Confidentiality is optional

It shall be possible to provide information authentication and integrity in an end-to-end method, regardless of information hierarchies. The typical method to provide this security function is through some type of information/message authentication code. IEC 62351-4:2007 and IEC 62351-91 describe how authentication and integrity is achieved for IEC 61850-8-1. A later version of IEC 62351-4 will provide means to ensure end-to-end data integrity through Proxy/Gateways.

Beneath information authentication and integrity, information availability is an important aspect for telecontrol. This technical report provides redundancy architectures to enhance the availability of information in control and maintenance centres.

The scheme shown in Figure 1 gives an overview of the connectivity and the communication paths. In particular it indicates the principle to access directly or indirectly – via the Proxy/Gateway – to an IED. An application of security controls for substation to control centre communication can be found in IEC 62351-10:2012, 6.4.3. Thus, the substation automation system has to be considered inside a perimeter of cyber security. The access is totally checked by security access points (this document does not describe such a security access point). The boundary of the electronic security perimeter is defined by the point, where the communication line leaves the perimeter of the substation over public ground. There might be more than one security access point, where separation of applications (e.g. control centre and maintenance centre) is required. When more than one client needs access to the same security access point information level access control, e.g. according to IEC TS 62351- 8:2011, may be added. IEC TS 62351-8:2011 may also be used in other cases, where different access rights are required.

The majority of applications for which this technical report is applicable will use the services of MMS (ISO 9506) mapped to ISO/IEC 8802-3 frame formats, as described in IEC 61850-8-1:2011.

The primary application for the use of indirect access, as described in this technical report, will be for telecontrol applications. Nevertheless this technical report does not imply that the use of a Proxy/Gateway is required for telecontrol applications. Direct access may also be used for telecontrol applications where applicable and accepted by the customer.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
4 CONTENTS
9 FOREWORD
11 INTRODUCTION
12 1 Scope
13 2 Normative references
Figures
Figure 1 – Connectivity and communication paths of a substation
15 3 Terms and definitions
16 4 Abbreviated terms
17 5 Use cases and requirements
5.1 Use cases
5.1.1 Overview
5.1.2 Actors
18 5.1.3 Use case diagram
Figure 2 – Use case diagram for substation to control centre communication
19 5.1.4 Use cases
5.2 Telecontrol
5.2.1 General
20 5.2.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
5.2.3 Actors
21 5.2.4 Use cases diagram
Figure 3 – Telecontrol use case diagram
22 5.2.5 Use case description
5.2.6 Sequence diagrams
23 Tables
Table 1 – Constraints for acquisition of status
24 Table 2 – Constraints for acquisition of alarms
Table 3 – Constraints for remote control
27 Figure 4 – Principle of data forwarding, depending on the operation mode
Table 4 – Forwarding of information depending on the operation mode
28 5.3 Synchrophasor
5.3.1 General
5.3.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
5.3.3 Use cases
5.4 Disturbance
5.4.1 General
5.4.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
5.4.3 Actors
29 5.4.4 Use case diagram
Figure 5 – Disturbance use cases diagram
30 5.4.5 Uses cases description
5.4.6 Sequence diagrams
31 5.5 Counting
5.5.1 General
5.5.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
32 5.5.3 Actors
5.5.4 Use cases diagram
5.5.5 Use cases description
Figure 6 – Counting use cases diagram
33 5.5.6 Sequence diagrams
5.6 Power quality
5.6.1 General
5.6.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
34 5.6.3 Actors
5.6.4 Use cases diagram
5.6.5 Use cases description
5.6.6 Sequence diagrams
Figure 7 – Power quality use cases diagram
35 5.7 Asset
5.7.1 General
Figure 8 – Asset management touches a broad range of core electric utility processes
36 5.7.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
5.7.3 Actors
5.7.4 Use cases diagram
5.7.5 Use cases description
5.7.6 Sequence diagram
Figure 9 – Asset supervision use cases diagram
37 5.8 Parameter configuration
5.8.1 General
5.8.2 Constraints / assumptions / design considerations
5.8.3 Actors
38 5.8.4 Use cases diagram
5.8.5 Use cases description
5.8.6 Sequence diagrams
Figure 10 – Parameter configuration use cases diagram
39 5.9 Communication requirements for SS to CC communication
5.9.1 General issues
40 Figure 11 – Levels and logical interfaces in substation automation systems
41 5.9.2 Functions based on substation- to-control-centre communication
5.9.3 Message performance requirements
Figure 12 – Definition of transfer time t
42 5.9.4 Introduction and use of message performance classes
43 5.9.5 Requirements for data and communication quality
5.9.6 Reliability
5.9.7 Availability
Table 5 – Typical Transfer time requirements for control and monitoring data
44 5.9.8 Requirements concerning the communication system
5.10 Modelling requirements for SS to CC communication
45 6 Configuration aspects
6.1 Requirements
46 6.2 Extension of the engineering process with SCL
6.2.1 General
6.2.2 Engineering workflow
Figure 13 – Scope of separated engineering workflow
48 6.2.3 Integrated engineering workflow – LANs with WAN
Figure 14 – Engineering workflow
49 6.3 Extension of the SCL schema from IEC 61850-6:2009
6.3.1 General
6.3.2 Modelling of redundancy
Figure 15 – Scope of integrated workflow
50 Figure 16 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundancyModes
Table 6 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundancyModes element
51 Figure 17 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:LinkModes
Table 7 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:LinkModes element
52 Figure 18 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ClientRedundancyServices
Table 8 – Elements of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ClientRedundancyServices element
53 Figure 19 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:LDeviceOverride
54 Figure 20 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundantServerTo
55 Table 9 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundantServerTo element
56 Figure 21 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundantClientTo
Table 10 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:RedundantClientTo element
57 6.3.3 Modelling of data references between SCL files
Figure 22 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:StandbyLinkMode
Table 11 – Values of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:tLinkModeEnum
58 Figure 23 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ExternalSCL
Table 12 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ExternalSCL element
59 Figure 24 – Diagram of eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ProxyOf
60 6.3.4 Functional naming
6.3.5 Examples
6.4 Security aspects
Table 13 – Attributes of the eTr-IEC61850-90-2:ProxyOf element
61 7 Basic Communication Structure – Principles and models
7.1 Communication and Modelling aspects
7.1.1 General
7.1.2 Communication aspects
62 Figure 25 – Communication concept
64 Table 14 – Use case vs. IEC 61850 – Service table
67 Figure 26 – SS to CC communication via direct access
68 Figure 27 – Basic configuration for indirect access
70 Table 15 – Link states
Table 16 – Usage of buffered / unbuffered reporting for the redundancy schemes
71 Table 17 – Requirements versus redundancy scheme
72 Figure 28 – Configuration without redundancy
73 Figure 29 – AccessPoint redundancy
74 Figure 30 – Device redundancy of frontend computers
75 Figure 31 – Device redundancy of Proxy/Gateway and frontend computers
76 Figure 32 – Multiple redundancies
79 Figure 33 – Usage of buffers and duplicate filter
80 7.1.3 Proxy/Gateway model
Table 18 – Extension of the common LN class
82 Figure 34 – Product related naming Proxy/Gateway
84 Figure 35 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Preserving the logical devices
85 Figure 36 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Renaming of logical devices
86 Figure 37 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Rearranging logical nodes
87 Figure 38 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Merging of logical nodes
88 Figure 39 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Splitting of logical nodes
89 Figure 40 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Transform to semantically defined LN
90 Figure 41 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Convert semantically defined LNs
91 Figure 42 – Modelling a Proxy/Gateway IED – Create an array subset
94 Figure 43 – Comparison of indirect, indirect transparent and direct access
98 7.1.4 Service tracking
7.2 Modelling and control block classes
7.2.1 General
7.2.2 CONTROL class model for Proxy/Gateway
Figure 44 – Principle of the Proxy/Gateway control model
100 Table 19 – Negative responses to service requests
103 Figure 45 – State machine of direct control with normal security
104 Figure 46 – Direct control with normal security – positive case
105 Figure 47 – Direct control with normal security – negative case
106 Figure 48 – State machine of SBO control with normal security
107 Figure 49 – SBO control with normal security – positive case
108 Figure 50 – SBO control with normal security – negative case
109 Figure 51 – State machine of direct control with enhanced security
110 Figure 52 – Direct control with enhanced security – positive case
111 Figure 53 – Direct control with enhanced security – negative case
112 Figure 54 – State machine of SBO control with enhanced security
113 Figure 55 – SBO control with enhanced security – positive case
114 7.2.3 SETTING-GROUP-CONTROL-BLOCK class model for Proxy/Gateway
Figure 56 – SBO control with enhanced security – negative case
115 7.2.4 REPORT-CONTROL-BLOCK class model for Proxy/Gateway
7.2.5 LOG-CONTROL-BLOCK class model for Proxy/Gateway
7.2.6 File transfer
Table 20 – Mapping of Comtrade folder names in the Proxy/Gateway
116 7.2.7 Applying cyber security to the Proxy/Gateway
Figure 57 – Integrity protection for the Clear Token
Figure 58 – Integrity protection for the Clear Token and the MMS message
117 8 SCSM aspects – MMS and ISO/IEC 8802-3
8.1 General
8.2 TCP/IP T-Profiles
Figure 59 – Integrity protection and encryption for the MMS message
Figure 60 – MMS Objects and services used
118 8.3 OSI T-Profile
9 SCSM aspects – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3 (IEC 61850-9-2)
119 Annexes
Annex A (informative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
A.1 General
A.2 ACSI basic conformance statement
Table A.1 – Basic conformance statement
120 A.3 ACSI models conformance statement
Table A.2 – ACSI models conformance statement
121 A.4 ACSI service conformance statement
Table A.3 – ACSI service conformance statement
124 A.5 Redundancy support statement
A.6 Transformation function support statement
Table A.4 – Redundancy mechanism support statement
125 A.7 Proxy/Gateway model support statement
Table A.5 – Proxy/Gateway transformation function support statement
Table A.6 – Proxy/Gateway model support statement
126 A.8 Instruction and comments on using this template
A.8.1 Comments
A.8.2 Instructions
A.8.3 Revision history
127 Annex B (informative) SCL syntax: XML schema definition
131 Annex C (informative) Substation SCD example
157 Annex D (informative) Control Centre SCD example
190 Bibliography

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BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-90-2:2016
$215.11