This part of IEC 62246, which is a Technical Report, provides basic technical background and experience about reliability data for reed switch-devices applied to machinery systems as well as E\/E\/PE safety-related control systems during the life cycle phases in general and industrial safety applications.<\/p>\n
The document selects typical safety applications from group safety standards, and includes national safety standards and regulations accordingly. This document shows major reliability aspects for a proper design according to the standards, but it does not cover all details of an individual design. The responsibility for the verification of system design remains with the system integrator\/manufacturer.<\/p>\n
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| 2<\/td>\n | undefined <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 4<\/td>\n | CONTENTS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 7<\/td>\n | FOREWORD <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 9<\/td>\n | INTRODUCTION <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 10<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 11<\/td>\n | 3.1 Failure of systems 3.2 Confirmation of safety measures for reed switch-devices <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 12<\/td>\n | 3.3 Reliability data of reed switch-devices Tables Table 1 \u2013 Diagnostic coverage (DC) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 13<\/td>\n | 3.4 Functional safety of reed switch-devices <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 14<\/td>\n | 4 Approach adopted for this document 4.1 General 4.2 Application of reed switches in accordance with IEC 62246 (all parts) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 15<\/td>\n | 4.3 Application in accordance with ISO 13849 (all parts), IEC 62061 and IEC 61508 (all parts) 4.4 Application of the design of the E\/E\/PE safety-related system Table 2 \u2013 Maximum allowable safety integrity level for a safety functioncarried out by a type A safety-related element or subsystem Table 3 \u2013 Performance level <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 16<\/td>\n | 4.5 Application of SIL capability to function units 4.5.1 General 4.5.2 Procedures 4.5.3 Random hardware failures Table 4 \u2013 Architectural constraints on subsystems: maximum SIL that can be claimed for a safety-related control function (SRCF) using this subsystem <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 17<\/td>\n | 4.5.4 Systematic faults 4.5.5 Safety manual 4.5.6 Application of SIL capability for the allocation of SIL to systems <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 18<\/td>\n | 5 Examples of reliability data for reed switch-devices 6 Examples of classification of involved groups for responsibility <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative)Hydraulic and pneumatic fluid power A.1 Example of electric actuator in hydraulic fluid power A.2 Examples of group safety standards A.3 Example of safety requirements A.4 Example of safety measures for the reed switch-device A.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 20<\/td>\n | A.4.2 Usage conditions of the reed switch-device Figures Figure A.1 \u2013 Architecture of an electric actuator in hydraulic fluid power <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 21<\/td>\n | A.5 Example of calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device A.5.1 Dangerous failure rate of the reed switch-device Figure A.2 \u2013 Control circuit of reed switches of magnetic proximity switches Figure A.3 \u2013 B10 value estimated by Weibull analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 22<\/td>\n | A.5.2 Estimates for diagnostic coverage (DC) A.5.3 Estimates for common cause failure (CCF) A.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Table A.1 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibility on an electric actuator <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 23<\/td>\n | Annex B (informative)Safety of machinery B.1 Example of guard interlocking device B.2 Example of group safety standards B.3 Example of safety requirements for the system B.3.1 Description of Type 3 interlocking device \u2013 example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 24<\/td>\n | B.3.2 Typical characteristics B.3.3 Remarks Figure B.1 \u2013 Electric interlocking device with a proximity switchactuated by a magnet actuator Figure B.2 \u2013 Electric interlocking device with two proximity switches <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 25<\/td>\n | B.3.4 Description of Type 4 interlocking device \u2013 example B.3.5 Typical characteristics B.3.6 Remarks B.4 Example of safety measures for the reed switch-device B.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user Figure B.3 \u2013 Typical architecture of guard interlocking device <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | B.4.2 Usage conditions of the reed switch-device B.5 Example of calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device B.5.1 General B.5.2 Dangerous failure rate of reed switch-device B.5.3 Estimation for diagnostic coverage (DC) B.5.4 Estimates for common cause failure (CCF) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | B.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Table B.1 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibility on a guard interlocking device <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 28<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative)Automatic electrical controls for household and similar use C.1 Example of automatic electrical burner control system C.2 Examples of group safety standards C.3 Example of safety requirements for the system Table C.1 \u2013 Detection methods and action in the event of emergency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 29<\/td>\n | C.4 Example of safety measures for the reed switch-device C.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user Figure C.1 \u2013 Architecture of a microcomputer type gas meter <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 30<\/td>\n | C.4.2 Usage conditions of reed switch-device C.5 Example of calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device C.5.1 Dangerous failure rate of reed switch-device Figure C.2 \u2013 Control circuit of a reed switch in flow sensor <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 31<\/td>\n | C.5.2 Estimates for diagnostic coverage (DC) C.5.3 Estimates for common cause failure (CCF) C.5.4 Accident damage reduction C.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Figure C.3 \u2013 Accident occurrences and casualties by year (Japan) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 32<\/td>\n | Table C.2 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibility on microcomputer type gas meter <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 33<\/td>\n | Annex D (informative)Household and similar electric appliances D.1 Example of automatic electric washing machine D.2 Examples of group safety standards D.3 Example of safety requirements for the system D.4 Example of safety measures for the reed switch-device D.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 34<\/td>\n | D.4.2 Usage conditions of reed switch-device Figure D.1 \u2013 Architecture of an automatic electric washing machine <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 35<\/td>\n | D.5 Example of calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device D.5.1 Dangerous failure rate of reed switch-device D.5.2 Estimates for diagnostic coverage (DC) D.5.3 Estimation for common cause failure (CCF) D.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Figure D.2 \u2013 Control circuit of a magnetic proximity switch <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 36<\/td>\n | Table D.1 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibilityon an automatic electric washing machine <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 37<\/td>\n | Annex E (informative)Electric power systems E.1 Example of measuring and protection relay system E.2 Industrial standards E.3 Safety requirements for the system \u2013 example E.4 Safety measures for the reed switch device \u2013 example E.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 38<\/td>\n | E.4.2 Usage conditions of the reed switch-device Figure E.1 \u2013 Architecture of a measuring and protection relay system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 39<\/td>\n | E.5 Example of the calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device E.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Figure E.2 \u2013 Control circuit of a reed switch in a measuring and protection relay Table E.1 \u2013 Failure rates of reed relays in a measuring and protection relay system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 40<\/td>\n | Table E.2 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibilityon a measuring and protection relay system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 41<\/td>\n | Annex F (informative)Railway application F.1 Example of automatic train control (ATC) system F.2 Examples of group safety standards F.3 Example of safety requirements for the system F.4 Example of safety measures for the reed switch-device F.4.1 Usage conditions of end-user <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 42<\/td>\n | F.4.2 Usage conditions of the reed switch-device Figure F.1 \u2013 Architecture of the automatic train control (ATC) system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 43<\/td>\n | F.5 Example of calculation of failure rates for the reed switch-device Figure F.2 \u2013 Control circuit of reed switches in the ATC system Table F.1 \u2013 Field failure rates of reed relays in the ATC system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 44<\/td>\n | F.6 Example of classification of involved groups for responsibility Table F.2 \u2013 Possible sharing of responsibility on reed relays in the ATC system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 45<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Reed switches – Reliability data for reed switch-devices in typical safety applications<\/b><\/p>\n |